Petitional Prayer, Determination & Freewill; Are they compatible?

Orthodox protagonists of all religions hold strong and conflicting beliefs, as between themselves, regarding Determinism, Freewill and the effects of Petitional Prayer.
 
Rabbis and Jewish philosophers have long recognised the tensions between those who hold the view that the course of any event is providential and those whose opinion is that such event was the result of the exercise, by man, of his freewill. This tension often exists in one and the same person, who then tries to find, by logic or irrational acceptance, which of the two views should prevail.
 
In the course of one’s intellectual and religious development, it is not uncommon to hold both such opposing beliefs but, given the choice, and however uncomfortable and disturbing the decision, the concept of man’s freewill must prevail, causing discomfort and emotional disturbance because it is at odds with much of our traditional teachings and of many of the petitional prayers which we recite.
 
It was, therefore, comforting and reassuring to discover similar conclusions were contained in the writings of several Rabbis and Jewish philosophers in the Mainstream.
 
Ibn Daud, a medieval Jewish philosopher wrote that the Contingent (an uncertain occurrence) which has no cause and the Free Act, which is undetermined, are as such, unpredictable.  Ibn Daud, therefore, sacrificed God’s knowledge of the Contingent and the Free, in order to save Man’s freedom of action.
 
Gersonides, another medieval Jewish philosopher wrote that God knows events insofar as they are determined, but He does not know them insofar as they are contingent.
 
Rabbi Lamm in his book, “Faith & Doubt" writes:  “The drama of human existence is predicated upon the divine grant of Freedom to Man.  But such Freedom for Man implies that God has willingly surrendered part of his control; that he has paradoxically, willed that things may go against his Will."
 
In his book “A Living Covenant", Rabbi Hartman writes “In granting that Covenant (The Sinai Covenant of Mitzvah) God chose to limit His infinite power of intervention  in human affairs."
 
Maimonides expressed views similar to those quoted above.  Although he believed that God had foreknowledge even of the Contingent (an uncertain occurrence) he dismissed any suggestion that providence influenced the result of Man’s freewill action, as is indicated in the following four examples, which appear in “Eight Chapters" which is part of his commentary on the Mishnah.
 
“People often think that a man is compelled to perform certain actions which are, in fact, voluntary, for instance, marrying a certain woman or seizing a certain sum of money illegally.  This is incorrect because God does not preordain the performance of either a Commandment or a Transgression."
 
“If Man’s Actions were done under compulsion (a providential act) the Commandments and Prohibitions of the Law would be nullified and they would all be absolutely in vain since Man would have no choice in what he does."
 
“If Simon, the killer of Reuben, were inevitably compelled to kill, and the latter inevitably had to be killed, why should we punish Simon?"
 
“All precautions such as those involved in building houses, procuring food, fleeing in fear and so forth would also be useless because, what has been preordained would inevitably happen."
 
The Holocaust is a recent catastrophe which tests our beliefs and faith to the maximum.  Did providence cause it or was it the result of Man’s freewill behaviour?
In 1933, hundreds of thousands of Europe’s six million Jews were observant and pious.  In the next 12 years, the vast majority suffered humiliation, deprivation, incarceration and eventual death.  During this period, the pious would have prayed for their redemption with absolute sincerity, joined possibly, if unexpectedly, by a large proportion of those who would not have been counted as Orthodox.  Who can really believe that on each of the days of Atonement during these 12 years, an all-merciful God considered the prayers of each worshipper, determined each person’s future, on his own merits and concluded that the vast majority merited torture and martyrdom?   Prayers would appear to have had no value and were certainly no influence.  The Freewill of man as expressed in the actions of the Nazis tends to support the view that the decision as to a person’s future lies with other human beings no less than with a God who predetermines everything.
 
Rabbi Dr.Eliezer Berkovits discusses this catastrophe in “Faith After the Holocaust" and explains that there are two meanings to the concept “Hester Panim" i.e. that God is hiding his face from man.  The first meaning is that punishment is a consequence of sin.  The second meaning suggests that God hides himself from the cry of the innocent.   
 
Rabbi Berkovits comments that whilst suffering does indeed follow sin, suffering can also follow virtue.  “It is obscene to suggest that Jewish martyrdom throughout the ages is the divine judgement.  It was injustice absolute; injustice countenanced by God." he wrote. 
 
He believed that the Holocaust falls within the second meaning of the concept “Hester Panim"; God hiding himself from the innocent.  Rabbi Berkovits explained that God does not determine in advance that one person be righteous and another be a sinner.  Moreover he opines:-  “But unless the possibility exists for a man to be a sinner if he so desires, man could not be righteous either".........."And his freedom of choice must be respected by God himself.  God cannot as a rule intervene whenever man’s use of freedom displeases him"........  “Man can be frightened but he cannot be bludgeoned into goodness."........“Freedom and responsibility are the very essence of man.  Without them Man is not human.  If there is to be man, he must be allowed to make his choices in freedom.  If he has such freedom he will use it.  Using it, he will often use it wrongly; he will decide for the wrong alternative.  As he does, so there will be suffering for the innocent." 
 
The idea that power resides in human beings, exercised through their freewill provides us with a straightforward uncomplicated explanation of the Holocaust, The Crusaders, the death of a child who is run down and killed by a car, the crash of an aeroplane when hundreds die and other similar tragedies which trouble mankind and over which our Rabbis have agonised throughout the centuries.  Tragedies of this kind are not providential but occur as a result of Man’s freewill actions or by his error of judgement.  Man was created with the ability to choose freely between right and wrong, good and evil.  But to accept this explanation, one must be prepared to overcome the uncomfortable and disturbing feeling which such acceptance might bring.
 
All these examples quoted above arrive at a conclusion by implication, that Petitional Prayer, as intended by most supplicants, is ineffective since Man’s freewill is not influenced by God. 
 
The question is whether the personal petitions which fill our prayer books requesting God’s intervention in situations resulting from the exercise of man’s freewill, have any value.  Likewise, those who are unaware that human behaviour, as a result of the exercise of freewill, is not the divine Will, believe, in their ignorance, that it is the hand of God that has brought disaster to them.  This conclusion is unfair to God and depressive for man.  
 
We are left with the problem of reconciling the above conclusions with the Talmudic maxim “Everything is in the hand of God except the fear of God."  The late Prof. Dr.  Yeshayahu Leibowitz, a leading authority on Maimonides, dealt with the matter in his book, “The Faith of Maimonides."  He has no difficulty in concluding that Maimonides explains the apparent contradictions by saying, “What our sages meant by “Everything is in the hands of God" was their referring, in this context, to nature and matters which are not the creation of man, i.e. trees, animals, souls, metals and angels - all these being in the hands of God.  
 
He wrote, “By these words, “everything" in the Talmudic context, does not refer to man’s behaviour but the natural setting in which he finds himself.  The way in which a man walks in his life is something he is responsible for and the consequences of it come to him from this way of life itself and not from heaven.  A man has no right to devolve responsibility for events which follow his own action on a factor outside himself; if he thinks in mythical terms, on fate; if he thinks philosophically, on causality; and if he thinks in religious terms, on special providence.  Man himself is responsible for his way of life and for all the events in his life which are consequent upon it - not merely for the psychical content called “fear of God".   
 
In his book “Horizons of Jewish Prayer", Rabbi Dr. Jeffrey M. Cohen poses the question “Does God answer prayer?"  and  he  discusses  many  aspects  of  the  question.  He concludes the discussion by stating “We must not forget that, if we pray and do not have our prayers fulfilled, it is never because God does not answer but rather because the answer is “No".  I think Rabbi Dr.Cohen is being unfair to the Petitioner, for God’s answer is more likely to be “Sorry, Petitioner, I have chosen to limit my power of intervention in human affairs."   
 
The Emeritus Chief Rabbi, Lord Jakobovits, in the foreword to the new Singers Prayer Book, contemplates “The Jewish idea of prayer" and disapproves of petitional prayers.  He does so for reasons different from those which were canvassed earlier.  He writes “What purpose can be served by formulating our pleas to God?  Does the all-knowing God, who knows our needs better than we do, require their articulation of what we feel in our hearts?  Still more difficult theologically, how can we hope by prayer to change His will?  Our very belief in the efficacy of our petitions would seem to challenge God’s immutability, and even questions His justice, since we should assume that whatever fate He decrees for man is essentially just; why, therefore, do we seek to reverse it?"  
 
“But such questions are based on a false, indeed pagan, understanding of prayer as a means of pacifying and propitiating the deity and thus of earning its favours.  It was against these perverse notions that the Hebrew Prophets directed their denunciations so fiercely when they fulminated against the heathen form of sacrifices, the original form of worship later replaced by prayer."   
 
“Like sacrifices, prayer is intended to change man not God.  Its purpose is to cultivate a contrite heart, to promote feelings of humility and inadequacy in man, whilst encouraging reliance on Divine assistance.  Through prayer, the worshipper becomes chastened, gains moral strength and intensifies the quest of spirituality, thereby turning into a person worthy of response to his pleas." 
 
If, as suggested above, many Rabbis and philosophers believe that God does not influence the outcome of man’s freewill behaviour and, if, as the Emeritus Chief Rabbi, Lord Jakobovits suggests, that the idea which influences the use of many  petitional prayer is pagan, what does Maimonides have to say on the subject?  Marvin Fox, another contemporary interpreter of Maimonides, in his book “Interpreting Maimonides" explains Maimonides’ attitude to petitional prayer as follows:-   
 
He first raises the question, a question of which all of those quoted above must have been aware, “What of the Biblical passages in which God is petitioned and responds?"  He replies, “We must first consider how Maimonides deals with the notion of God’s response to prayer.  Given his severe strictures against the doctrine that God is subject to any affections, together with his view of God as utterly unlike man and utterly without relations to anything outside Himself, it is obvious that petitionary prayer can hardly be interpreted by Maimonides in accordance with the common religious view.  In fact, he takes a position that is to say the least, daring.  This position, according to some, may well be open to charges of destroying the foundations of religious faith.  Maimonides’ theory is that the Torah at times adopts certain metaphysically unsound teachings, because they are useful means for leading men to desirable ends that cannot be achieved otherwise."   
 
But if, as all appear to imply, petitional prayer is ineffectual, for one reason or another, why do we say petitional prayers?  Is it to change man, not God, in order to deserve to receive the favours which are being petitioned as suggested by the Emeritus Chief Rabbi?  Is it a basic and irrepressible expression of the human spirit as suggested by Marvin Fox?  Is it a step towards the ideal; to worship God having attained a knowledge of God without any relation to the events which befall the worshipper, just as they befall every other person, as suggested by Prof. Leibowitz.  Is it just habit or upbringing?  Why?   
 
The original form of worship was sacrifice, but after the destruction of the second temple, sacrifice was replaced by prayer.  In the almost 2,000 years which have ensued, there has been a dramatic and constantly increasing number of prayers included in our Liturgy, particularly during the medieval period and perhaps even more so since the advent of printing.  Is it that our Rabbis decided that, in order to maintain a viable Judaism during our dispersion, it was necessary to develop the Synagogue as the centre of local communities and introduce prayer of all kinds, mainly as a cohesive element?   
 
I have no doubt that our Emeritus Chief Rabbi fully believes in the concept that man has freedom of action but I would dearly like to know how he reconciles this belief with his statement quoted above, namely “Through prayer, the worshipper becomes chastened, gains moral strength and intensifies the quest for spirituality, thereby turning into a person worthy of a response to his pleas."   
 
Using the Maimonides’ examples quoted above, how can God respond to a man’s plea:- 
 
For a happy forthcoming marriage, if by his freewill action he marries a woman who proves to be totally unsuitable and incompatible.
 
For a comfortable life with reasonable income if by his freewill action he enters into a business relationship with a dishonest person who defrauds him of all his business capital and assets.
 
For “Reuben" to be granted a long and healthy life if “Simon", by his own freewill action, decides to kill Reuben whilst he is in his prime.
 
To sum up, it would seem that we preach freewill but teach Divine Providence.  Our prayer books are full of personal petitions requesting that God intervenes in various kinds of situations.  Then, when bad things happen to good people, they have been indoctrinated to assume that it was the result of the Hand of God and then sometimes (often) lose faith, whereas a high proportion of those bad things happened only as a result of someone’s freewill behaviour and, for those Rabbis who believe, as did Maimonides, that man is entirely responsible for the results of his freewill action, are they not, by encouraging Petitional Prayer, encouraging the Petitioner to take the name of God in vain?
 
November 1994